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Fear, Irrationality, and Risk Perception 
Henry L. Chambers, Jr. • 
This brief commentary makes two points. 1 The first is that fear can play 
multiple roles in any decision-making process. The second is that accurately 
determining whether reactions to fear are irrational is a complex task. Though 
neither point necessarily requires that symposium participants abandon their 
positions, together they suggest that extreme care is necessary in developing 
policy prescriptions based on the claim that fear can trigger irrationality. 
I. FORMS OF FEAR 
Many papers in this symposium treat fear as a precursor to irrational risk 
perception.2 If fear is only defined in that manner, its effect may appear lim-
ited to distorting thought processes and decision making. However, if fear is 
considered to be related more generally to thrill, danger, and uncertainty 
about the unknown, its effects can be neutral or positive.3 When viewed 
broadly, fear can serve at least three different functions. Fear can be a com-
modity, fear can focus thoughts, or fear can trigger action. 
A. Fear as Commodity 
In carefully packaged forms, fear can be bought and sold like a com-
modity.4 For example, people will pay to ride roller coasters and other "thrill 
rides" that are supposed to evoke fear. However, it is unclear why a roller 
coaster should trigger fear. Surely the fear does not stem from the belief that 
the rider might be injured as a result of the roller coaster's crash or malfunc-
tion. If that were a real concern, few likely would ride. Though some have 
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond; formerly James S. Rollins Pro-
fessor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia. 
I. This commentary is adapted from remarks given on a panel at the Fear and 
Risk in Times of Democratic Crisis conference at the University of Missouri-
Columbia School of Law on February 20, 2004. 
2. See, e.g., Neal Feigenson et al., Perceptions of Terrorism and Disease Risks: 
A Cross-national Comparison, 69 Mo. L. REv. 991 (2004); Paul Slovic, What's Fear 
Got to Do with It? It's Affect We Need to Worry About, 69 Mo. L. REv. 971 (2004) 
(suggesting that in some situations fear may impede common sense and straightfor-
ward analysis). 
3. See Rachel F. Moran, Fear: A Story in Three Parts, 69 Mo. L. REv. 1013 
(2004) (providing various explanations of fear's effects). 
4. Indeed, fear is currently bought and sold in some television shows. See, e.g., 
Fear Factor (NBC television broadcasts, 2003-04 broadcast season). Fear Factor 
contestants must overcome their fears to win money. 
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died riding roller coasters,5 such accidents are unexpected and not the realiza-
tion of an accepted risk in riding. Nonetheless, the greater the fear or thrill 
generated, the more some want to ride. 
Even when fear itself is not sold, it can be instrumental in selling other 
products. For example, life insurance purchases may stem from fear. Though 
life insurance does not eliminate the fear of death, it minimizes the fear that 
one's family will be destitute as a result of one's death. Given the relatively 
low risk of early death among the young and healthy, and the concomitant 
low risk that one's family will face the early death of a member and become 
destitute as a result, life insurance for the young and healthy would appear to 
be an irrational expenditure of money.6 However, there is nothing irrational 
about spending even a significant amount of money to lower the risk of a 
relatively unlikely occurrence if the pain that would accompany the unlikely 
occurrence is quite high. One might still overpay for insurance, but such 
overpayment reflects insufficient market information-i.e., that the insurance 
could have been purchased more cheaply elsewhere-rather than irrational 
risk perception. Simply, that fear is a part of the decision to buy life insurance 
does not make the purchase irrational. Indeed, when fear is packaged as a 
commodity or has an effect on the purchase of a commodity, it can be-
though is not always-assessed or valued in a highly rational way. 
B. Fear as Focuser 
Fear can also make one focus on what really matters and how much or 
how little something is valued. Indeed, fear may initiate a thought process 
that would never have occurred otherwise.7 For example, I have had a number 
of discussions with various law professor colleagues about keeping office 
doors open or closed when speaking with students. Some colleagues have told 
me that they always keep their doors open because they are afraid that untrue 
allegations of harassment or misconduct could accompany closed-door stu-
dent meetings. Convinced that such unfounded allegations could ruin their 
careers, they have reached their decisions after thinking (often for the first 
time) about the costs and benefits of requiring that all student meetings be 
open-door. Usually, their consideration includes why professors meet with 
5. See, e.g., Gary Gentile, Coroner Says Disneyland Coaster Rider Bled To 
Death, CONTRA COSTA TIMES (Walnut Creek, Cal.), Sept. 11, 2003, at 4; Connie 
Page, Six Flags Ride Reopens, A Month After Fatal Fall, BOSTON GLOBE, May 30, 
2004, at B4; see also Kimberly Atkins & Bob Fredericks, Girl Killed on Play/and 
Ride, JOURNAL NEWS (Westchester County, N.Y.), May 23,2004, at lA. 
6. The likelihood that one's family would become destitute if the family's pri-
mary breadwinner died might be high. However, the probability that both the primary 
breadwinner will die and the family would become destitute as a result of the death is 
necessarily lower than the mere probability that the primary breadwinner will die. 
7. In this way, fear can be likened to a campaign contribution that causes a 
politician to focus on one issue rather than another. 
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students, whether such meetings should occur if they cannot be conducted in 
an open-door setting, and the general nature of relationships between students 
and professors. However one feels about the open-door/closed-door issue, the 
discussion-certainly fueled or triggered by fear which itself may be irration-
ally assessed-is a fruitful one that may force professors to rethink and 
strengthen their relationships with students. 
C. Fear as Trigger 
As a number of this symposium's contributors suggest, fear can appear 
to trigger seemingly irrational actions from citizens, courts, and legislatures 
alike. 8 Indeed, particularly well-designed experiments may appear to prove 
that irrational thought processes accompany fear. 9 However, this effect may 
be similar to the effect that any overemphasized factor may have in a thought 
process. For example, love, joy, pain, and retribution can all trigger seem-
ingly irrational thought processes. However, what appears irrational from one 
perspective may be highly rational from another perspective. 
For example, many may deem the purchase of an expensive engagement 
ring to be a highly irrational act. At best, an engagement ring is a symbol of 
love, not love itself. A significant expenditure of money on a symbol of love 
by an impecunious but deeply loving couple may appear to be irrational. 
Nonetheless, the purchase and gift of an engagement ring may be considered 
highly rational. First, it arguably demonstrates the kind of seemingly irra-
tional spending that supposedly accompanies love, thereby confirming the 
existence of love. Second, one might never convince one's putative spouse to 
get married until an engagement ring has been purchased. Like love, fear may 
trigger irrational actions or rational actions that simply appear irrational. 
The comments above note three forms that fear can take. Rather than 
suggest that fear necessarily leads to rational decision making, these com-
ments suggest that a one-size-fits-all vision of fear as invariably a trigger of 
irrational risk perception is too narrow. As importantly, they suggest that fear 
may be unexceptional, as it may affect thought processes no differently than 
other factors or emotions. 
II. THE TRANS FORMATIVE POWER OF FEAR 
Though fear can have the same effect on decision making as other emo-
tions, it may have a greater capacity to change us and, in the process, convert 
acts that seemed irrational in the past into those that appear rational today. 
Simply, fear can transform us in ways that fundamentally alter how we per-
ceive our world. There's A Nightmare in My Closet, a wonderful children's 
8. See, e.g., Slovic, supra note 2, at 984-89. 
9. See, e.g., Feigenson, eta!., supra note 2, at 995-99. 
1050 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69 
book, provides insight on the transformative power of fear. 10 In the book, a 
child plans to vanquish the nightmare that lives in his closet. In the process of 
facing and embracing his fear/nightmare, he realizes that his fear was not so 
scary after all. Indeed, literally embracing the nightmare gives the child an 
opportunity to be nurturing and caring toward that which had scared him. 
Once he faces his first nightmare, the other nightmares in his closet are no 
longer scary. They are merely problems to be managed. The book suggests 
that facing and overcoming fear literally changes how the little boy looks at 
his surroundings. This lesson is well worth learning or relearning at any age. 
Of course, the events of September 11, 2001, may have had a transfor-
mative effect on us as a society. The fears triggered and faced on that day 
literally changed many of us. The result may be that our definition of rational-
ity has changed as well. Indeed, many scenarios that may have seemed irra-
tional before September 11th are now routinely contemplated. Similarly, 
courses of action that may never have been taken before September 11th have 
been or may yet be taken. 11 What qualifies as rational is different today than 
what qualified as rational before September 11th. Though the reactions of 
those first transformed by fear may have seemed irrational to the majority at 
first glance, those reactions may come to define rationality if society as a 
whole is ultimately transformed by the same fears. 
Ill. FEAR AND DEMOCRATIC CRISIS 
Given that this symposium focuses on Fear and Risk in Times of De-
mocratic Crisis, I would be remiss if I did not very briefly mention race, risk 
perception, perceived irrationality, and democracy. Some who suggest that 
fear results in inaccurate or irrational risk perception seem to believe that 
individuals overestimate known or knowable risks and act irrationally based 
on those overestimations. However, whether a risk has been misperceived or 
overstated may depend on how a risk is defined. For example, the risks I face 
as a black man differ from those faced by others who are not black men. My 
fears stem from risks I face and derive in part from incidents in which I or my 
friends have been involved; they are likely different than the fears of those 
who are not black men!2 If my experiences are deemed exceptional (and they 
are somewhat exceptional or atypical because they are experiences of a black 
10. See MERCER MAYER, THERE'S A NIGHTMARE IN MY CLOSET ( 1968). 
11. Certain interrogation strategies approved in the wake of the War on Terror-
ism may fall into this category. See Edward Epstein, Interrogating POWs Defended-
Rumsfeld Says Rules Meet Geneva Pact, S.F. CHRONICLE, May 13, 2004, at A15 
(noting methods of interrogation that apparently have been approved by U.S. govern-
ment officials); Amanda Ripley, The Rules of Interrogation: It's a Murky Business, 
But Some Methods Work Better Than Others, TIME, May 17,2004, at 44 (same). 
12. Indeed, the notion that different people, even those who appear similar, may 
have different fears and experiences is captured in the title and flavor of a popular 
novel. See BEBE MOORE CAMPBELL, YOUR BLUES AIN'T LIKE MINE (1995). 
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man in a predominantly non-black land), my reaction to them may be deemed 
to be based on irrational or inaccurate risk perception. Many in the minority 
community and some in the majority community will deem my fears and the 
precautions I take against bad outcomes rational because they may share the 
same fears or appreciate them. However, if the majority of my fellow citizens 
deem my fears to be irrational or based on faulty risk perception, legislators 
may have little incentive to act on my fears. Because the fears of minorities 
may be deemed exceptional or non-representative and therefore easily dis-
missed by the majority, minorities arguably always live "in times of democ-
ratic crisis. "13 
CONCLUSION 
Fear may not always be rational and may in fact lead to irrational behav-
ior. However, we must be vigilant when labeling fear and actions triggered by 
fear as irrational. Improperly deriding fear as anti-rational may stem from a 
lack of recognition that competing value systems or desires may yield differ-
ent outcomes. For example, consider what a standard downward-sloping 
demand curve tells us about people: 
Market for Good A 
$ 
s 
D 
0 q Quantity 
The upper left portion of the demand curve (D) represents a small number of 
people who are willing to pay a substantial amount for Good A, for which 
most people would only pay far less. The people in the upper left portion of 
the demand curve may be irrational, but they cannot be deemed irrational 
13. Indeed, the ethnicity of who complains may affect whether the complaints 
are taken seriously. See PATRICIA]. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 
152 (1991) ("It may be different when someone white is describing need. Shorn of the 
hypnotic rhythmicity that blacks are said to bring to their woe, white statements of 
black needs suddenly acquire the sort of stark statistical authority that lawmakers can 
listen to and politicians hear. But from blacks, stark statistical statements of need are 
heard as strident, discordant, and unharmonious. Heard not as political but only 
against the backdrop of their erstwhile musicality, they are again abstracted to mood 
and angry sounds."). 
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merely because they are willing to pay far more for Good A than most. They 
may have different sets of desires or values vis-a-vis Good A than most (or 
substantially larger bank accounts than most). Even if fear pushed those con-
sumers to the upper left portion of the demand curve for Good A, e.g., flight 
insurance or gas masks, it is unclear that they are necessarily any less rational 
than those on other segments of the demand curve for Good A or than con-
sumers who occupy the upper left portion of any demand curve. 
That a person acts outside of the mainstream in assessing or reacting to 
fear does not make him irrational. Fear may drive one person to take one ac-
tion and drive another person to take another more drastic action. If both ac-
tions are rational, fear has not triggered irrationality, though the temptation is 
to deem the more drastic action irrationally driven by fear. If the different 
responses are based on the different values or preferences of the two people, 
ascribing irrationality to one person's action may be inappropriate. 
One must be careful in labeling fear or reactions to fear as irrational 
even when evaluating a person's reactions only by reference to the person's 
internal value system. That a person is willing to pay a significant amount to 
eliminate a small risk but seems unwilling to pay a smaller amount to elimi-
nate a significantly larger risk may not necessarily make him irrational, de-
pending on how the person processes the risk or whether contemplating the 
risk transforms the person and how he rationally evaluates the risk. A truly 
irrational response to fear occurs when an individual judges a fear or its risk 
reasonably, then takes an irrational action to meet the judgment. That is, in 
order for a response to be irrational, fear must deform a rational thought proc-
ess into an irrational one rather than transform one rational thought process 
into a different rational thought process. Though fear can presumably trans-
form a rational thought process into an irrational one, this may occur in far 
fewer circumstances than suggested at this symposium. 
